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The Security Council of the United Nations established the
United Nations Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) with its Reso-
lution 687 on April 3, 1991.1  It was the first compensation system
established under the authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
and was designed to process and pay claims arising from the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.2  Resolution 687 confirmed that Iraq was
liable “for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damages
and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Govern-
ments, nationals and corporations . . . .”3  Resolution 687 also created
a fund to pay those claims and a commission to administer that fund.
The details of the compensation fund and the commission were estab-
lished by Security Council Resolution 692 on May 20, 1991.4
The goals of the UNCC were (1) to effect a speedy, fair, and effi-
cient evaluation of the claims made against Iraq and to process them
in accordance with the various resolutions of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil, and (2) to make payments to claimants from the funds obtained
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1. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991), available at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0687.pdf.
2. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is entitled “Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” See Carlos Al-
zamora, The UN Compensation Commission: An Overview, in THE UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION 3, 3–4 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995); Veijo Heiskanen,
The United Nations Compensation Commission, 296 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 265–67
(2002); Norbert Wuhler, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Con-
tribution to the Process of International Claims Resolution, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 249,
251 (1999).
3. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 1, ¶ 16.
4. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991), available at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0692.pdf.
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from Iraq in accordance with the procedures and priorities decided by
the Security Council.5
The progress of the UNCC was speedy by international stan-
dards.  After its conception in April of 1991,6 the Secretariat of the
UNCC was established on July 29, 1991, the first decisions of the
Governing Council were made in August, 1991,7 and claim forms
were distributed that December.8 The first Commissioners were ap-
pointed on March 30, 1993,9 and the first report by Commissioners of
claims was submitted to the Governing Council on April 14, 1994.10
The UNCC completed the entire claim review process by June of
2005.11
Eventually, the staff of the Secretariat grew to over 300 employ-
ees.  There were eighteen panels of Commissioners who made recom-
mendations on the 2.68 million claims that were submitted for a total
claimed amount of $352.5 billion.12  Roughly 15% of those claims
were recommended for payment and approximately $20 billion has
been paid to claimants from funding out of Iraq’s oil export
revenues.13
The purpose of this paper is to examine the design of the UNCC
from a variety of perspectives: its historical setting, the alternative
design approaches that have been taken in other compensation con-
texts, the details of its design, and its role in the design of future
claims resolution facilities.  This paper also examines the extent to
which concepts of legitimacy and rough justice14 conflict or reinforce
each other in the context of the UNCC.
5. See generally David D. Caron & Brian Morris, The UN Compensation Com-
mission: Practical Justice, Not Retribution, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 183, 186–89 (2002)
(discussing the mandate of the United Nations Compensation Commission and its
successes).





11. Peter H. Sand, Compensation for Environmental Damage from the 1991 Gulf
War, 35 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 244, 245 (2005).
12. Id; see also John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission
and the Balancing of Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of
Iraq, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 141, 143 (2005).
13. Sand, supra note 11, at 245.
14. “Rough justice” embodies the philosophical conflict between fairness and effi-
ciency, often described as a conflict between Kant and Bentham.  In more common
parlance, is “perfect” the enemy of the “good”?  To what extent does the need for a
precise evaluation of one person’s damages, for example, preclude the evaluation of
other persons’ damages because of the lack of time or money. “Rough justice” errs on
the side of efficiency, arguably sacrificing equity in individual cases in order to
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.15  After a series of
United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning the inva-
sion, demanding withdrawal, and imposing an arms embargo and ec-
onomic sanctions, the Gulf War was commenced on January 16,
1991.16  On March 2, 1991, U.N. Security Council Resolution 686 de-
manded compliance with its previous resolutions and that Iraq
“[a]ccept in principle its liability under international law for” losses,
damages, and injuries as a result of its invasion and occupation of
Kuwait.17  Iraq agreed to comply with Resolution 686 the following
day.18  Security Council Resolution 687 reaffirmed that Iraq “is liable
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including envi-
ronmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury
to foreign Governments, nationals, and corporations, as a result of
Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”19  The same res-
olution created a fund to pay the claims for these losses and directed
the Secretary-General to develop recommendations for implementing
the resolution.20
The Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19
of Security Council Resolution 687 on May 2, 1991 proposed the
UNCC.21  The historic model for reparations has been a lump sum
payment by the vanquished to be distributed by a sovereign victor.
The amount of the payment was generally related to punitive inten-
sity and the ability to pay.  The distribution was usually a political
process and the beneficiaries could vary considerably.22  The UNCC,
achieve equity for the whole. See generally Caron & Morris, supra note 5, at 190–99
(analyzing the legitimacy and fairness of the UNCC claims process).
15. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 265.
16. Id. at 266.
17. S.C. Res. 686, ¶ 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1991), available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/22/IMG/
NR059622.pdf?OpenElement.
18. Letter from Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of the Republic of Iraq, to President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22320
(1991), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/072/05/
img/N9107205.pdf?OpenElement. See also Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 266.
19. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 1, ¶ 16.
20. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19.
21. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para-
graph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687, ¶ 4, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/22559 (May 2, 1991), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION 385 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995).
22. See John R. Crook, The UNCC and its Critics: Is Iraq Entitled to Judicial Due
Process?, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 77, 85–87 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1995).  For a detailed discussion of the historical analogues of the UNCC,
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although not inconsistent with its war reparations ancestry, drew on
three more recent models: (1) the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals, (2) a
variety of government-sponsored compensation programs, (3) and a
broad range of claims resolution facilities from other contexts.
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) was established
in 1981 as part of the Algiers Accords, which resolved Iran’s Novem-
ber 4, 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and retention
of U.S. Embassy personnel as hostages, and the subsequent freezing
by the United States of Iranian assets in the U.S.23  It is a bilateral
adjudicative body located in The Hague, The Netherlands.  After
more than 26 years of operations, the end of its work is not yet in
sight.  The Tribunal is based upon an international arbitration model
with full equality of representation and consequential adversarial
processes.24  It consists of full-time judges who work together to re-
solve cases one-by-one with full deliberations.25  These judges osten-
sibly are not part of a political process and are required under the
Tribunal’s rules, which are modified UNCITRAL rules of arbitration,
to act independently.  The initial focus of the Tribunal was on the
business and government claims rather than individual claims.26 The
funding for these claims was secured by a requirement in the Algiers
Accords that Iran post a $500 million security account to pay any
claims against it.27
The authors of the UNCC were intimately involved in the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal and were insistent on avoiding its perceived
failings: the bias toward business and governments, the obstructive
potential of party-appointed judges operating against the backdrop of
often hostile relations between the two sponsoring states, the pitfalls
of the same judges ruling on the same issues presented by repeat
players, the expense, the slow pace, and the general frustration of
see generally David J. Bederman, Historic Analogies of the UN Compensation Com-
mission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 257 (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1995).
23. Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Applied to
Claims Against Iraq, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 15, 15
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995).
24. See id. at 16.
25. See id. at 18.
26. See id. at 19–22.
27. Id. at 25.
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powerlessness for the political process to operate in an open and
transparent manner.28
A second source of authority for the UNCC arises from numerous
government sponsored claims processes detailed in Appendix A.
These generally statutory or litigation-oriented programs were cre-
ated in response to perceived governmental or corporate wrongs that
had not been adequately addressed.  While each process was substan-
tively different, they shared many similarities.  They each had a ra-
tionale, a source of authority and funding, and a defined
administrative scheme and mechanism for managing costs.  Each
process also required a definition of beneficiaries, proof for an award,
and a predetermined computation method for determining the
amount of an award.  Although some processes provided for an opt-
out right, most were designed to be global.   A review of these various
designs reveals common elements for reparation that focus on “rough
justice”29 in the distribution process.  They have a legal and political
approach to the calculation of damages as well as elements of individ-
ualization in the distribution process.
Appendix B focuses on a third series of claims resolution ap-
proaches: common U.S. procedures for compensation.  An overview of
these facilities by the method for calculating a distribution, or the
model, the decider, implementation, size, funding, and rationale, nar-
rative, metaphor, or paradigm provides some insight into the think-
ing of the designers of the UNCC.  There are several varieties of
valuation methodologies: flat payment, a grid, selected variables, a
formula based upon surrogate variables, or all potential variables.
The decider can vary from legislature to judge to jury to the parties
themselves.  Implementation is by third party administrator, a judi-
cial administrator, or the litigation process.   Size varies from less
than 1,000 to over 5,000.  Funding can be limited or unlimited, public
or private.  The metaphor can be disaster, reparations, welfare, tort,
or contract.
An analysis of these designs reveals little consistency except in
the relationships of the metaphor to the valuation methodology.  The
more the metaphor seems to reflect fate and collective harm, the
more the valuation methodology seems to be the same for the claim-
ants.  The more there seems to be accountability or blame for the
harm, the more the valuation methodology becomes individualized.
28.
29. See infra notes 58–60.
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III. DESIGN OF THE UNCC
There are at least eight initial variables that must be considered
in designing a claims resolution process: function, metaphor, author-
ity and funding, size and similarity, organization and implementa-
tion, eligibility criteria, damage methodology, and compensation.30
A. Function
The UNCC had the dual function of determining the total
amount of damages and the allocation of those damages to each
claim.31  Rather than the traditional bifurcated procedure of first de-
termining a lump sum payment and then deciding how the fund cre-
ated by that payment should be allocated to each claim, the UNCC
evaluated each claim individually and the sum of all claims consti-
tuted the total damages.  Since the funding came from a percentage
of the oil sold by Iraq—25-30 % at different times—the total amount
available for distribution was calculated on a rolling basis.32  The
Governing Council prioritized payments depending upon the type of
claim filed, with a priority to the smaller, individual claims.33
B. Metaphor
A second and potentially most critical variable is the narrative,
metaphor, or paradigm that best represents the claims resolution fa-
cility.  In the case of the UNCC, the metaphor is mixed.  The para-
digm for the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which was the international
conflict claims resolution facility that immediately preceded the
UNCC, was international arbitration.34  The authors of the UNCC
process were attempting to create a new paradigm because of the per-
ceived slowness, expense, and detriment to individual claims exper-
ienced in the Iran–US Claims Tribunal.  At the same time, they did
not believe that a single, lump sum payment approach could be accu-
rately determined.  The alternative they used was more bottom-up:
value each claim on its own merits, total the value of all the claims,
30. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1362–74 (2005).
31. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 1, ¶¶ 16–19.
32. Sand, supra note 11, at 245 (noting that as of June 2005, roughly $20 billion
of the $52.5 billion awarded has been disbursed to victims).
33. Michael F. Raboin, The Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure of the United
Nations Compensation Commission: A Practical Approach to Mass Claims Processing,
in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 119, 130–31 (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1995).
34. See Bederman, supra note 22, at 268.
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prioritize the payment of those claims, and the overall outcome would
be based upon the independent evaluation of neutral decision-mak-
ers, guided by broad guidelines established by the political judgment
of the international community.
The narrative was a hybrid process: political and judicial; largely
inquisitorial with some adversarial elements; both collective and in-
dividual depending upon the type of claim; and bottom-up rather
than top-down.35  Arguably the UNCC is sui generis and its holdings
lex specialis.  The closest analogies for the process of evaluating
smaller claims would be the tort claims resolution facilities in the
U.S.  The process for deciding larger claims appear to be more like
international arbitration.  The role of Iraq, however, was limited and
the Commissioners were constrained by the guidelines provided by
the Governing Council.  The other distinguishing factor was the sheer
volume of the claims: 2.6 million claims for $352.5 billion.36  The met-
aphor would best be described on the basis of a hybrid political-judi-
cial process dispensing “rough justice.”
C. Authority and Funding
The authority for the UNCC was the United Nations.  Security
Council Resolution 686 was based upon Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter that applied to all U.N. members, including Iraq.37  In addi-
tion, Iraq agreed to the claims resolution process in conjunction with
the end of the hostilities.38  Thirdly, the implementation of the claims
process was accomplished by an international body subject to its
traditional constraints.39  The Security Council also established a
funding mechanism.  Originally, Security Council Resolution 778,
adopted on October 2, 1992, provided operational funding for the
35. See generally Bederman, supra note 22 (arguing that the UNCC was largely
consistent in terms of structure and jurisprudence with traditional modern interna-
tional claims practices); Chung, supra note 13 (discussing the importance of the
UNCC’s use of neutral third party adjudicators to undertake fact-finding and its
largely inquisitorial rather than adversarial process to achieving the delicate balance
between protecting the rights individual claimants and the rights of the Government
of Iraq).
36. Sand, supra note 11, at 245.
37. S.C. Res. 686, supra note 17.
38. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 266–67 (noting that on April 6, 1991, Iraq ac-
cepted the terms of the ceasefire agreement as set forth in U.N. Security Council Res-
olution 687, which included compensation provisions).
39. Alzamora, supra note 2, at 3–4 (“[The Security Council] decided that appro-
priate compensation should be provided through procedures and bodies established
within the multilateral framework of the United Nations. . . . The UNCC thus became
a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, with all the effects and consequences . . .
which that implies.”)
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UNCC pending the implementation of more permanent financing
contained in Security Council Resolutions 705 and 986 by allocating
30% of Iraq’s annual oil revenues to the UNCC.40  That percentage
was changed in Security Council Resolution 1330 to 25% in 2000 and
in Security Council Resolution 1483 to 5% in 2003.41  As of June,
2005, more than $20 billion has been paid to claimants.42
D. Size and Similarity
The size and similarity of claims are also critical variables in de-
signing a claims resolution facility.  The Governing Council, upon rec-
ommendation by the Secretariat, decided to divide the claims into six
categories for processing and disposition.43  Category “A” consisted of
claims for those individuals who had to leave Kuwait or Iraq between
the invasion on August 2, 1990, and the end of hostilities on March 2,
1991.  Category “B” was for claims for individuals who suffered seri-
ous personal injury or lost a family member as a result of the inva-
sion.  Category “C” claims were for individuals making claims for a
variety of damages up to $100,000.  Category “D” claims were for in-
dividuals seeking more than $100,000 in compensation.  Category “E”
claims were designed for corporations and other business entities.
Category “F” contained claims for governments and international
organizations.
The theory behind Category “A” claims was that a known total
number of non-Iraqis left either Kuwait or Iraq as a result of the in-
vasion and should be eligible for limited compensation for their dislo-
cation.44  The Governing Council assigned $2,500 to $8,000 for each
claimant depending on whether there were other family members in-
volved.  The claims were submitted by countries on behalf of their
40. S.C. Res. 778, ¶¶  1–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/778 (Oct. 2, 1992), available at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0778.pdf; S.C. Res. 705, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/705
(Aug. 15, 1991), available at http://www.uncc.ch/resolutio/res0705.pdf; S.C. Res. 986,
¶ 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14,1995), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/
resolutio/res0986.pdf (creating the “Oil-For-Food Program”).
41. S.C. Res. 1330, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (Dec. 5, 2000) available at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1330.pdf; S.C. Res. 1483, ¶¶ 20–21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1483 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1483.pdf;
S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004), available at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1546.pdf.
42. Sand, supra note 11, at 246.
43. Raboin, supra note 33, at 120.
44. See Francis E. McGovern, The Intellectual Heritage of Claims Processing at
the United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSA-
TION COMMISSION 187, 196–97 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995).
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respective nationals and could be submitted in a computerized for-
mat.  The assumptions were that minimal proof would be adequate,
that Iraq was responsible for any dislocation, that the dislocation
caused some level of harm, and that the total number of claims would
not exceed the total number of foreign nationals who were in Kuwait
or Iraq on August 2, 1990.45
Category “B” claims were limited to $2,500 to $10,000 per claim-
ant and were designed for the smaller personal injury claims that
could be processed expeditiously with limited proof requirements.46
The Commissioners could request additional information from the
Category “B” claimants and were required to determine that there
was a causal relationship between the conflict and the harm.47
For other individual claims for departure, personal injury, death,
personal property loss, lost securities, lost income, real property dam-
age, and individual business losses up to $100,000, there was Cate-
gory “C”.48  As with “A” and “B”, the processing of “C” claims was
expedited.  The Governing Council left to the Commissioners the is-
sues of causation and valuation.  The level of supporting documenta-
tion for “C” claims varied considerably.  The Commissioners were
asked to decide in any given case whether or not the damage claimed
should be awarded, recognizing the practical difficulties of retrieving
documents in the context of an armed conflict.
If an individual wanted to claim more than $100,000 for the
same types of harm listed in “C”, they would need to file a Category
“D” claim.49  The elements of the “D” claim were identical to “C”—
awards for departure, personal injury, death, personal property loss,
lost securities, lost income, real property damage, and individual bus-
iness losses.  It was possible to claim up to $100,000 in “C” and the
remainder in “D,” or to claim all losses in “D”.50
45. Id.
46. Criteria for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims, U.N. Compensation
Comm’n, ¶¶ 10–13, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1991/1 (Aug. 2, 1991), available at http://
www.uncc.ch/decision/dec_01.pdf [hereinafter Criteria for Expedited Processing of Ur-
gent Claims].
47. McGovern, supra note 44, at 201.
48. Criteria for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims, supra note 43,  ¶¶ 14–15.
49. Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, ¶
7, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/191/7 (Dec. 4, 1991), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/deci-
sion/dec_07r.pdf [hereinafter Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims].
50. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 283–84.
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The category “E” claims were for corporate or other entity losses
except for losses incurred from the trade embargo and related mea-
sures.51  Losses included payments to employees or others pursuant
to contractual obligations.  The “E” claims were further divided into
“E1” oil sector claims; “E2” for other corporate or business entity
claims; “E3” for non-Kuwaiti construction and engineering claims;
and “E4” for Kuwaiti private sector claims other than oil claims.52
The final category of claims, “F”, was designed for governments
and international organizations for losses of government property,
evacuation costs, payments to employees or in accordance with con-
tractual obligations, and environmental damages and depletion of
natural resources.53  The “F” claims were further divided into “F1”
claims for evacuation costs, property losses, and other similar losses;
“F2” for Jordanian and Saudi Arabian claims, “F3” for Kuwaiti
claims, and “F4” for environmental claims.54  There was also a mixed
E/F category for overlapping claims involving export guarantees and
insurance claims.55
E. Organization and Implementation
As previously indicated, the organization of the UNCC consisted
of three separate entities: the Governing Council, the Secretariat,
and the Commissioners.56  The Governing Council was composed of
all members of the Security Council at any given time.57  Its role was
to determine policy, establish the financing and administration of the
fund, approve the processes and procedures for determining claims,
and to make payments from the fund.
The Secretariat was composed of an Executive Secretary ap-
pointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Governing
Council and a staff of lawyers, professional consultants, and other
support personnel.58  The Secretariat was located at the Villa La
Pelouse on the grounds of the United Nations in Geneva,
Switzerland.
51. Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, supra note 49, ¶9.
52. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 284–85.
53. Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, supra note 49, ¶¶ 16–22.
54. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 286.
55. Id. at 285.
56. Alzamora, supra note 2, at 4.
57. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 270–71.
58. Id. at 272–74.
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The Commissioners were nominated by the Secretary-General as
recommended by the Executive Secretary and appointed by the Gov-
erning Council.59  Their role was to sit in panels of three to review
and evaluate claims and submit to the Governing Council their rec-
ommendations for payment.  The Commissioners were drawn from a
wide range of geographical and professional backgrounds including
law, finance, and damage evaluation, and performed their functions
as independent neutrals who were asked to make their decisions in
their individual capacity rather than as representative of any parties
of interest.60  The staffing for the Commissioners came from the Sec-
retariat whose functions included giving them legal, technical, and
administrative assistance.
The interaction between legitimacy and rough justice in the
UNCC appears most vividly in the interaction among the Governing
Council, Secretariat, and Commissioners.  The Governing Council
provided legitimacy to the UNCC because it was coterminous with
the Security Council of the United Nations and operated by consen-
sus.  The Commissioners provided legitimacy because they were inde-
pendent and impartial.  The Secretariat provided legitimacy because
of its international composition and its role as an implementer, not a
policy maker.
On the other hand, the Governing Council was the ultimate deci-
sion maker and its decision-making process was largely political.  As
a result, political decisions regarding rough justice that were made by
the Governing Council without input from Iraq conflicted with some
conceptions of legitimacy.  The Commissioners and the Secretariat
were bound by these decisions.  In practice, however, the Governing
Council delegated most decisions and the application of their policies
to the Commissioners.
From the perspective of rough justice, this interaction was quite
similar.  The Governing Council made a small number of policy deci-
sions that were converted into reality by the Commissioners and im-
plemented by the Secretariat.
The limitations on the role of Iraq in this process created some
conflict between legitimacy and rough justice.   Because the total
losses incurred by virtue of the invasion most probably did not exceed
59. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Art. 18,
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/ 1992/10 (June 26, 1992), available at http://www.uncc.ch/
decision/dec_10.pdf [hereinafter Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure].
60. Id. at Art. 19, ¶ 2–Art. 21, ¶ 1. See also Raboin, supra note 33, at 135–36.
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the losses awarded, the amount of money paid by Iraq in the aggre-
gate was, in all likelihood, unaffected by its lack of role.  Rough jus-
tice and legitimacy were not pulling in different directions.  In any
given case, however, the rough justice mandated by the expedited
process probably was affected by the lack of participation by Iraq, and
hence, there was, at the detail level, an undermining of legitimacy by
the procedures used by the UNCC.
Like many other claims resolution facilities, the UNCC utilized
an inquisitorial model of decision-making with a large number of self-
imposed institutional restraints embodied in the Provisional Rules
for Claims Procedures.61  These rules were adopted by the Governing
Council on June 26, 1992, and contained the essential procedures for
claimants to file claims, for the Secretariat to process claims, and for
the Commissioners to decide claims.62
Section I contained general provisions and definitions.63 Claim-
ants were defined broadly, but non-governmental organizations were
not included as entities who could file claims.  Submissions and evi-
dence provided by a claimant were not exclusionary.
Section II related to the submission and filing of claims.64  With
a few exceptions, only governments and international organizations
of states were permitted to file claims and those claims were required
to be submitted in a prescribed format and in English.  Contacts with
claimants were to be made only through the minions of governments
filing claims.  The rules provided for the creation of a Registry with
the Secretariat to receive and register claims and to make a prelimi-
nary assessment of claims to ensure that all formal requirements
were followed.
One of the most important rules was contained in Article 16,
which provided for periodic reports by the Executive Secretary con-
cerning the number, type, and compensation sought in claims as well
as any significant legal and factual issues raised by the claims.65  The
reports also provided an opportunity for Iraq and other governments
and international organizations who had filed claims to make com-
ments and to provide additional information.
Section III was based upon the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules and governed the ap-
pointment, conflicts, qualifications, requirements, and privileges and
61. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 59.
62. Raboin, supra note 33, at 131.
63. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 59, Art. 1–3.
64. Id. at Art. 4–17.
65. Id. at Art. 16, ¶¶ 1–2.
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immunities of Commissioners.66  The pool of Commissioners was de-
signed to be diverse with regard to geography and expertise, and was
limited to individuals with unquestioned integrity and experience.
The procedures for the operation of the panels of Commissioners
were contained in Section IV.67  Each of the Commissioners on a
panel of three must be of a different nationality; work was to be con-
ducted in private; and confidentiality was required.  Priority was
given to the “A”, “B” and “C” panels over all others and expeditious
processing with consistent application of rules was reinforced.  Arti-
cle 31 established the hierarchy of applicable law: Security Council
resolutions, decisions of the Governing Council, and other rules of in-
ternational law.68
Article 32, in conjunction with Article 16, operated to ensure that
the government of Iraq or any other government may produce infor-
mation or views concerning factual or legal issues raised by claims
and that the Commissioners would have access to those filings.69
The rules anticipated meetings of each panel of Commissioners called
by the Chairman to be held in Geneva and virtually unlimited assis-
tance from the Executive Secretary and Secretariat.  The amounts
recommended for payment by the Commissioners were subject to re-
view by the Governing Council.  The decisions of the Governing
Council were final and the reports of the Commissioners were public
except for the names of individual claimants and any other informa-
tion determined to be confidential.
F. Eligibility Criteria
One of the most critical aspects of any claims resolution facility is
contained in the criteria that establish eligibility for payment.  As
previously discussed, non-Iraqi governments and international orga-
nizations of states were the only eligible entities who could file claims
for individuals or business organizations with the requirement of “di-
rect loss, damage . . . or injury . . . as a result of Iraq’s unlawful inva-
sion and occupation of Kuwait.”70  A variety of UNCC decisions
allowed claims resulting from military operations from August 2,
1990 to March 2, 1991: departure from or inability to leave Iraq or
66. Id. at Art. 18–27. See also Raboin, supra note 33, at 135–36.
67. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 59, Art. 28–43.
68. Raboin, supra note 33, at 138.
69. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 59, Art. 32, ¶¶ 1–2.
70. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 1, ¶ 16
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Kuwait, actions by Iraq in connection with the invasion or occupa-
tion, the breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq, or illegal
detention.71
In regard to business losses, the Governing Council held that all
property losses attributable to direct Iraqi confiscation or destruction
were compensable as well as damages because of the absence of per-
sonnel.72 Contract cases were limited to losses resulting from the in-
vasion and occupation of Kuwait.73  Losses occurring in connection
with trade sanctions against Iraq were not eligible for compensa-
tion.74  Combined losses could be apportioned by the Commis-
sioners.75
Reflecting the Governing Council’s desire to expedite the “A”,
“B”, and “C” claims, the evidentiary provisions in Article 35 of the
Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures provided that the claimants
had the responsibility for providing “simple documentation” for “A”
and “B” claims and “appropriate evidence” for “C” claims.76  Other
claims “must be supported by documentary and other appropriate ev-
idence sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the
claimed loss.”77  The Commissioners were the arbiters of the quantity
and quality of evidence required, and they could request additional
evidence for the “D”, “E”, and “F” claims.78
G. Damage Methodology
The damage methodology chosen by the Secretariat and ap-
proved by the Commissioners and the Governing Council was partic-
ularly innovative.79  “Commissioners will wish to apply relevant
valuation methods to different categories of loss.”80  For the “A”
71. See Bederman, supra note 22, at 291.
72. Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business Losses: Types of
Damages and Their Evolution, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, ¶¶ 12–13, U.N. Doc. S/
AC.26/1992/9 (Mar. 6, 1992), available at http://www.uncc.ch/decision/dec_09.pdf.
73. Id. at ¶¶ 7–10.
74. Id. at ¶ 6.
75. Compensation for Business Losses Resulting From Iraq’s Unlawful Invasion
and Occupation of Kuwait where the Trade Embargo and Related Measures Were Also
a Cause, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/15 (Jan. 4, 1993),
available at http://www.uncc.ch/decision/dec_15.pdf [hereinafter Compensation for
Business Losses].
76. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 60, Art. 35, ¶ 2.
77. Id. at Art. 35, ¶ 3.
78. Id. at Art. 35, ¶ 4.
79. McGovern, supra note 44, at 195–203 (describing the unique nature of the
UNCC reparations program in that its “mandate is neither in the typical reparations
nor the typical arbitration mold”).
80. Compensation for Business Losses, supra note 76, ¶ 7.
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claims there was a “matching” process wherein computerized claims
filed by governments were run against data gathered from indepen-
dent sources of arrival and departure information to determine if
there was simple documentation to justify an award.81  The “A” panel
of Commissioners developed a series of decision rules incorporated
into the computer programs in order to verify or create extrapolation
verification of the claims.  Approximately 920,000 “A” claims were
processed using this methodology by October of 1996.82
Because there were less than 6,000 “B” claims, the Secretariat
organized them by issues and the “B” panel of Commissioners decided
those issues in the context of individual cases.83  Once those decision
rules were applied to groups of cases, the Commissioners could en-
sure that there was horizontal consistency among similarly situated
cases.  All the “B” claims were processed by December, 1995.84
The “C” claims represented a more intense methodological chal-
lenge.  Not only were there more loss elements than “A” or “B”
claims—departure, personal injury, death, personal property loss,
lost securities, lost income, real property damage, and individual bus-
iness losses—there were also more claims – approximately
1,660,000.85  Included within these claims was a consolidated claim
filed by the Central Bank of Egypt on behalf of over 800,000 Egyptian
workers who had not received full compensation for their employ-
ment prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.86
The Secretariat and the “C” panel of Commissioners used a vari-
ety of methodologies drawn largely from the experiences of U.S.
claims resolution facilities for personal injury torts.87  They used
computerized decision trees, case matching, regression analysis-
based modeling, range verification modeling, and even some case-by-
case determinations.  In essence, the methodology was based upon
claim type and varied in accordance with the data submitted, inde-
pendent data available, and principles of “rough justice.”  Article 36
81. McGovern, supra note 44, at 200.
82. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 278–79.
83. McGovern, supra note 44, at 201.
84. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 280.
85. Id. at 282.
86. Id. (noting that the consolidated claim represented roughly 1.2 million indi-
vidual claims valued at over $490 million); see also Final Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Egyptian Workers’ Claims, U.N.
Compensation Comm’n, ¶¶ 2, 63, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1997/3 (Oct. 2, 1997), available at
http://www.uncc.ch/reports/r97-03.pdf (awarding roughly $84.4 million for 223,000
workers).
87. McGovern, supra note 44, at 201–02.
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of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures allowed the Commis-
sioners to seek expert advice on the verification and valuation of
claims.  Thus, the Secretariat and the Commissioners could obtain
external data to assist in the analysis of claims.88  Claims that were
within the state’s statistically predictable ranges received less scru-
tiny.  Claims made for amounts higher than those statistical expecta-
tions received more scrutiny.  The verification process was conducted
by the Secretariat and Commissioners without resort to requests for
additional evidence from individual claimants.  The claims processing
was completed in June, 1999.89
The “D” claims were essentially the same as “C” but for individ-
ual losses above $100,000.  The Governing Council, however, estab-
lished more exacting requirements for the “D”, “E”, and “F”
Commissioners to follow: “documents and other evidence must exceed
the reasonable minimum that was required for claims in categories
‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’.”90  As a result, the purely inquisitorial approach even-
tually moved toward the arbitrational approach as the claims became
larger and more complex.  The methodology of the “D” commissioners
varied among the approximately 10,800 claims.91  As appropriate,
“C” methodology was used but, because of the smaller number of
claims, more individual attention could be given to each claim.  Arti-
cle 38 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures addressed the
“D”, “E”, and “F” claims and allowed the panels to “adopt special pro-
cedures appropriate to the character, amount and subject matter of
particular types of claims under consideration.”92  The claims could
be organized differently, could involve additional requests for infor-
mation from claimants, could allow direct contact with claimants,
and could involve input from the Government of Iraq.  The processing
of the “D” claims was to be completed in July, 2003.93
There were approximately 5,800 “E” claims analyzed by five “E”
panels of Commissioners.94  Great attention was given to individual
88. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 60, Art. 36.
89. Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concern-
ing the Seventh Installment of Individual Claims for Damages Up to US $100,000
(Category “C” Claims), U.N. Compensation Comm’n, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1999/11
(June 24, 1999), available at http://www.uncc.ch/reports/r99-11.pdf.
90. Decision Concerning Explanatory Statements by Claimants in Categories “D”,
“E”, and “F”, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/Dec. 46 (Feb. 3, 1998),
available at http://www.uncc.ch/decision/dec_46.pdf.
91. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 284.
92. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, supra note 59, Art. 38.
93. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 284.
94. Id. at 285.
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determinations that a loss eligible for compensation actually oc-
curred.95  In addition, there were individual reviews to determine the
amount of the actual and eligible loss.  As a result, the mass process-
ing methodology utilized in “A”, “B”, and “C” claims was not availa-
ble.  The most systematic approaches involved standardized
valuation procedures and verification methods developed with the as-
sistance of experts in the fields of accounting and insurance loss ad-
justing.96  As a result, the Commissioners were able to use consistent
approaches to expense claims, tangible asset and property losses,
non-pecuniary losses, real property losses, contract losses, and loss of
business and business interruption claims.97  There were also uni-
form practices for exchange rates, collateral sources, mitigation of
damages, interest, subrogation, and duplicate and overlapping
claims.98
Almost 400 “F” claims were filed by governments and interna-
tional organizations.99  These claims were disaggregated and organ-
ized in a fashion similar to the large and complex “E” claims and were
subject to the same level of scrutiny and individualized review.  Prob-
ably the most challenging claims were for environmental losses in-
cluding abatement and prevention, cleaning and restoring,
monitoring and assessment, and depletion or damage to natural re-
sources.100  The “F4” panel of Commissioners worked at the cutting
edge of environmental science and law to make its decisions on the
168 claims before it.  Their reports of over 500 pages recommended
payment of $5.26 billion on total claims of $85 billion.101
H. Compensation
As indicated previously, compensation for claims awarded by the
Commissioners and the Governing Council was made with monetary
contributions from Iraq based upon a percentage of the value of its oil
exports.  Funding for the UNCC was based upon Security Council
Resolutions 705 and 706 in 1991.  Initially, however, Iraq did not
agree and Security Council Resolution 778 in 1992 allowed the use of
frozen Iraqi assets.102  Eventually 25 percent of the proceeds from
Iraqi oil sales under the 1995 Security Council Resolution 986 “oil-
95. Id. at 367.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 370–78.
98. Bederman, supra note 22, at 305-07.
99. Heiskanen, supra note 2, at 287.
100. Sand, supra note 11, at 247–49.
101. Id. at 245.
102. S.C. Res. 778, supra note 40, ¶ 1.
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for-food” program went to the Compensation Fund.103  The Gov-
erning Council established in its Decision 17 on March 23, 1994 a
priority schedule for the payment of claims, and in Decision 18 on the
same date, rules for distribution and transparency.104  Priority was
given to “A”, “B”, and “C” with pro rata payments until there were
sufficient funds to pay all of these claims.  Eventually 852,499 “A”
claims were paid $3.15 billion, 91.16 % out of the 923,158 claims
made for $3.5 billion; 3,935 “B” claims were paid $13.4 million,
66.84% out of 5,734 claims filed for $20.1 million, and of  1,736,288
“C” claims filed for $11.5 billion, approximately $5.2 billion, or
45.08%,  was paid to 672,452 claimants.105  In total, approximately
$8.4 billion has been paid to 1.5 million individual “A”, “B”, and “C”
claimants. “D” claims of 13,864 for $16.5 billion resulted in 10,343
claims approved for a total of $3.3 billion.106 Of 6,571 “E” claims
made for $78.7 billion, 4,048 were awarded $26.3 billion.107  Of 123
“E/F” claims for $6.15 billion, 57 claimants were awarded $311 mil-
lion.108  A total of 393 “F” claims for $236.1 billion were reduced to
285 claims and $14 billion awarded.109
IV. CONCLUSION
The design of the United Nations Compensation Commission
was, in some respects, well within the tradition of war reparations
facilities and, in other respects, unique.  Its political governance
structure within the U.N. and the Governing Council ensured that it
was responsive to the demands of its founders.  Its quasi-judicial ele-
ments—rules of procedure, independent Commissioners, evidentiary
standards, inquisitorial style—made it a hybrid entity, neither
purely political, nor purely adjudicatory.  One of the most striking
aspects of its procedure was its lack of adversarialness with restric-
tions on Iraq’s ability to participate in its decision-making processes.
Probably the most legitimizing aspects of its procedure related to the
103. S.C. Res. 986, supra note 40, ¶ 8.
104. Priority of Payment and Payment Mechanism: Guiding Principles, U.N. Com-
pensation Comm’n, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/ Dec. 17 (Mar. 24, 1994), available at http://
www.uncc.ch/decision/dec_17.pdf; Distribution of Payments and Transparency, U.N.
Compensation Comm’n, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/Dec. 18 (Mar. 24, 1994), available at http:/
/www.uncc.ch/decision/dec_18.pdf.
105. Status of Processing and Payment of Claims, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/sta-
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transparency of its proceedings.  Notwithstanding the political over-
sight, the operation of the UNCC was consistent with the well-estab-
lished tradition of claims resolution facilities—inquisitorial process,
horizontal and vertical equity in the application of its rulings, and a
reasoned elaboration of those rulings.
What distinguishes the UNCC most from its predecessors is the
quantity and variety of the claims before it.  The UNCC was able to
process and pay millions of disparate claims within a record time
frame.  This accomplishment was achieved by the disaggregation of
claims into more digestible segments, and the application of state-of-
the-art decision-making tools to assist the Commissioners in reaching
their decisions.  The hallmark of the UNCC was pragmatism: the as-
similation of “rough justice” into judicial proceedings without de-
stroying the legitimacy of the enterprise in the eyes of the
international community.  There will be a continuing debate in the
context of the UNCC regarding the concept of legitimacy and the con-
cept of rough justice, as well as the interaction between them.  Hope-
fully, the design of the United Nations Compensation Commission
will serve as a model, or at least a yardstick, for future claims facility
designs.
The UNCC will remain unique, particularly because of the open-
ended nature of its funding and the lex specialis necessitated by its
governance. The UNCC should, however, be a model for the design of
future claims resolution facilities because of its tailoring of decision-
making techniques to different types of claims.  By adopting the
processes to the claims, rather than vice versa, the UNCC has be-
come a model of rough justice that will have long-lasting precedential
impact.
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Appendix A
Indian Claims
Rationale Compensation for real property
Authority/Payer Statute/U.S. Government
Nature of Reparation $818,172,607 + ongoing
Global/Finality/Opt Out Global/No Finality/Opt Out Right
Administration/Cost Commission/ $5,000,000 +
Definition of Identifiable Indian tribe/546 claims/ Treaty
Beneficiaries/Number with U.S. Government
of Claims/Proof
Computation of Award/ Commission heard land cases./ Indian tribe
Proof had to prove: the extent of use and
occupancy of the land, the exclusiveness of
the use and occupancy, and whether the use
continued “for a long time.”
Radiation Exposure
Rationale Exposure to radiation 1942-1972
Authority/Payer Statute (1990)/ U.S. Government
Nature of Reparation ~$1,148,503,470
Global/Finality/Opt Out Intended to be/Not final/Opt Out Right
Administration/Cost Compensation System/ minimal
Definition of Downwinder: living in the area (14,557
Beneficiaries/Number claims)
of Claims/Proof Onsite Participant: working at the site (7,576
claims)
Uranium Miner: working in the mine (7,266
claims)
Uranium Miller: manufacturing the uranium
(1,213 claims)
Ore Transporter: transporting the ore (279
claims)
~25,891 total claims




$100,000 for miners, millers, and
transporters.
Syphilis Experiments
Rationale Medical Experiment 1932-1972
Authority/Payer Settlement of law suit (1973)/ U.S.
Government
Nature of Reparation $9,066,000; free medical and burial services
for living participants; public apology by US
President
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Global/Finality/Opt Out Global/Final/Opt Out Right
Administration/Cost Court/ Lawyer’s fee of $1,000,000
Definition of 600 black men in Macon County, Alabama/579
Beneficiaries/Number claimants/Claimants were found via study
of Claims/Proof records.
Computation of Award/ Living Syphilitics: $37,500
Proof Living Controls: $16,000
Deceased Syphilitics: $15,000
Deceased Controls: $5,000
September 11th Compensation Fund
Rationale Terrorist Attacks September 11, 2001
Authority/Payer Statute (2001)/ U.S. Government
Nature of Reparation $7,049,415,537
Global/Finality/Opt Out Global/Final/ Opt Out Right
Administration/Cost Special Master/$86,873,312
Definition of Individuals present in NY, DC, or PA who
Beneficiaries/Number were physically injured or killed./ 7,403
of Claims/Proof claims/ Present at a site or sought treatment
within 24-72 hours.
Computation of Award/ $250,000-$7.1 million (depending on income
Proof level)
Holocaust: German Slave Labor in Eastern Europe
Rationale Slave Labor by German Government
Authority/Payer Class action settlement/German statute
(2001)/ US Government promise of “peace”/
public and private contributions.
Nature of Reparation $5 billion
Global/Finality/Opt Out Global/Not Final/Yes Opt Out
Administration/Cost International and Governmental Agencies
Definition of Slave laborers
Beneficiaries/Number Forced laborers
of Claims/Proof
Computation of Award/ $7,500 for former slaves
Proof $2,500 for former forced laborers
Burden of proof was very low.
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IMPLEMENTATION: Multiple Special Masters
FUNDING: Limited/Public
PARADIGM: Welfare/Tort
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